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Chapter 4  Consciousness and the Antipathetic 
Fallacy
4.1  Introduction
In chapter 1 I had occasion to mention dualism, which I characterized as the view that 
conscious mental states have features which cannot possibly be possessed by physical 
states.  At th at stage I argued that the price of dualism was epiphenomenalism, on the 
grounds, roughly, that dualism requires conscious mental states to be distinct from the 
physical causes of behavioural and other physical effects.  But I left it as an open ques 
tion whether the arguments for dualism, and in particular for its conception of 
consciousness, made epiphenomenalism a price worth paying. 
 In this chapter I want to argue that there is in fact no good motivation for the dualist 
view of co nsciousness, and that we should therefore uphold the simple physicalist 
position that all mental states, including conscious states, are identical with or realized 
by physical states.  The advantage of this physicalist position is that, unlike dualis m, 
it allows us to view conscious mental states as genuine causes of behavioural effects. 
 It will be convenient to use the term "physical state" in a liberal sense throughout 
this chapter, to include not only strictly physical states in t he sense of chapter 1, but 
also any second-order or higher-order states which are realized by physical 
states.1  The differences between these different kinds of "physical states" will not 
matter for most of this chapter, since most of the arguments between dualism and 
physicalism arise in exactly the same way whichever kind of "physical state" the 
physicalist identifies conscious mental states with. 
 At the end of the chapter, however, the difference between "first-order" and "higher-
order" physical states will become relevant.  So far in this book I have tended to 
assume that mental states are, if anything, identical with higher-order physical states, 
rather than with first-order ones:  as I observed in chapter 1, it seems unreasonable to 
hold that extraterrestrials, or people with brain prostheses, cannot share thoughts with 
us, just on the gounds that their brains contain different kinds of molecules.  With the 
specifically conscious features of mental st ates, however, the situation is somewhat 
different.  For, as we shall see, there are persuasive arguments, based on various 
inverted spectrum thought experiments, for holding that such conscious features in 
particular depend on the physics of the bra in, rather than on its higher-order 
organization.  This is fine-tuning, however.  The prior issue is whether conscious 
features can be identical with any kind of physical property, first-order or higher-
order.  After that we can worry about which kind of physical property they might be 
identical with.2
 I shall proceed as follows. In the next three sections I shall consider some recent 
arguments for dualism.  I shall argue that they are quite ineffectiv e.  Accordingly, in 
section 4.5, I shall ask why the intuitive pull of dualism is nevertheless so strong.  My 
diagnosis will be that we are seduced by a fallacy, which I shall call the "antipathetic 
fallacy", into thinking of consciousness as so mething distinct from the physics of the 
brain.  The final five sections of the chapter will then explore some of the 
consequences of this diagnosis. 
4.2  What is it Like to be a Bat?
Much of the contemporary literature on consciousness begins with Thomas Nagel's 
article "What is it Like to be a Bat?" (1974).  Nagel argues that conscious mental life 
involves certain essentially subjective facts, facts that can only be appreciated from 
the "first-person" point of vi ew, from the point of view of the subject of those 
conscious experiences.  Such subjective facts contrast with objective facts, like 
physical facts, which are accessible from the "third-person" perspective, independent 
of any particular subjective po int of view.  Nagel concludes on this basis that any 
physicalist account of mind must fail to account for the subjective aspect of mental 
life. 
 Nagel illustrates this thesis by inviting us to reflect on the echolocatory experience 
of bats.  Nagel takes it that bats, like other mammals, have conscious experiences.  In 
particular, he takes it that bats have conscious sensory experiences when they 
echolocate.  But, he points out, we human beings are unable to adopt the ba ts' point 
of view, and so have no idea what those bat experiences are like.  You might think 
that echolocation would be like flying about in the dark and hearing lots of high-
pitched noises.  But that would be what it is like for beings like us, with human 
perceptual apparatuses, to echolocate, and not, presumably, what it is like for bats to 
echolocate.  And, indeed, the more we think about it, the more it becomes clear that 
we have no grip on the subjective nature of the bat's echolocator y experience. 
 Nagel focuses on bats, not because he has any doubts about bats being conscious, 
but rather because our complete inability to adopt the bat point of view highlights the 
existence of the subjective side of bat experience.&nbs p; In the case of other human 
beings, and perhaps even of chimpanzees and dogs and squirrels, we can put 
ourselves in their places, and imagine having experiences like theirs.  And so it is 
easier, in these cases, not to notice that grasping the subj ective aspect of experience 
requires us to abandon the objective, third-person perspective.  But since we can't put 
ourselves in the place of bats, this particular example forces us to recognize that a 
purely objective perspective does not in fact gi ve us any access to the subjective 
reality of experience. 
 Despite the plausibility of Nagel's line of argument, I think that physicalism can 
meet the challenge he poses.  Let us proceed in stages.  For a start, we should 
immedia tely concede that there is one sense in which we human beings are indeed 
cut off from the facts of bat experience.  We do not have echolocatory experiences, 
whereas bats do.  In this sense it is undoubtedly true that we "lack access to", "cannot 
appreciate", or whatever phrase you prefer, the "subjective reality" of bat 
experience.  But this observation in itself clearly yields no argument against 
physicalism.  For physicalists are just as well placed as anybody else to explain this di 
fference between bats and humans.  Physicalists think that conscious experiences are 
identical with certain physical events in the brain.  So physicalists can say that the 
difference between bats, who have echolocatory experiences, and humans, w ho do 
not, is simply that certain physical events, namely, those which constitute 
echolocatory experiences, occur in bats, but not in humans.  In this sense the 
physicalist can happily agree that bats have access to experiences which humans 
cannot ap preciate. 
 This point is central to the physicalist view of conscious experience.  Physicalism 
does not deny that there are conscious experiences, nor, if you wish, that "that it is 
like something to have them".  The claim is onl y that this is nothing different from 
what it is to be a physical system of the relevant kind.  Of course there is something it 
is like to experience pain, or to see red, or to taste cheese.  And such things are highly 
important, especially for the subjects of those experiences.  But, insists the physicalist, 
they are not non-physical things.  What makes it like that for you is that you are you, 
that is, that you are a physical system of a certain sort.  If you were physically dif 
ferent in the relevant respects, things would be different for you. 
 This is the initial physicalist response to Nagel's challenge.  There is, however, a 
more persuasive line of argument suggested by Nagel's position.  Suppose th at you 
did somehow come to have echolocatory experiences.  Wouldn't you then differ from 
other human beings, not just in having had those experiences, but in then knowing 
something that other humans didn't know, namely, what echolocatory experiences 
were like?  And wouldn't this be knowledge of an essentially subjective fact?  For 
note that you could have known everything there is to know about bat experience 
from an objective point of view -- you could have been an expert on bat echolocati on, 
who knew all about the physics and physiology and computational workings of the 
bat's brain -- and yet, prior to having had the echolocatory experiences, you would not 
have known what they were like.  So it seems to follow that after you have had an 
experience you acquire knowledge of certain facts -- the subjective, phenomenal 
features of the experience -- which are necessarily omitted by any objective, 
physicalist story. 
4.3  What Mary Didn't Know
This "knowledge argument" is developed explicitly by Frank Jackson in 
"Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) and "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).  Jackson 
simplifies the issue by focusing on a case where it is mere happenstance, rather than 
the wrong cognitive appa ratus, that prevents somebody having certain 
experiences.  He tells the story of Mary, who is an expert on the psychology and 
physiology of human colour vision.  Mary knows everything there is to know about 
the goings-on in our brains when we wh en we see red, say.  However, Mary has 
always lived in a restricted black-and-white environment.  All the objects she has ever 
seen are black or white or grey.  She has never herself seen anything red.  Then one 
day she is presented wi th a red object.  She then has the experience of seeing 
something red.  And as a result she learns something she didn't know before.  She now 
knows about the phenomenal nature of red colour experiences, when before she was
ignorant of this.  Remember, however, that Mary had always possessed complete 
objective information about colour experiences.  So, once more, it seems to follow 
that there are items of information about experience that must be omitted by any 
physicalist account. 
 This "knowledge argument" adds an extra dimension to Nagel's original defence of 
subjective facts.  But there is still plenty of room for physicalism to resist it.  The 
natural physicalist response to this argument is to admit that there are indeed before-
and-after differences in Mary, consequent on her having had her first experience of 
red, but to deny that these involve her becoming acquainted with some subjective 
feature of colour experience.  There are other ways of c onstruing the changes in Mary, 
which do not require the postulation of such subjective facts, and which do not 
therefore imply that a physicalist account of experience must be incomplete. 
 In this section and the next I shall outline a phs yicalist construal of these 
changes.  In this section I shall consider changes in Mary's recreative powers of 
imagination and recall, and in her ability to reidentify her experiences.  In the next 
section I shall consider changes in her concepts of experience.  This will involve 
retreading some relatively familiar philosophical ground.  But my aim is not just to 
block Jackson's argument -- other philosophers, referred to below, have already 
shown how to do that -- but rather to point t o a striking common feature of the 
experientially produced changes in Mary, namely, that they all yield ways of thinking 
about experiences that deploy versions of those same experiences.  This point will be 
central to my subsequent diagnosis in secti on 4.5 of the "antipathetic fallacy" which I 
take to be responsible for the intutive pull of dualism. 
 The first before-and-after change to be considered concerns Mary's new powers of 
recreation.  Once she has seen red, Mary can recre ate the experience of seeing red, in 
imagination and memory, whereas before she couldn't.  Mary could of course always 
imagine, in the third-person, so to speak, that somebody else was seeing red, in the 
sense that she could imagine such-and-such phy siological or behavioural occurrences 
in that person.  And, similarly, she was always able to remember, in the third-person 
again, that somebody had seen red.  But now she has a new ability, the ability to 
imagine or recall having the expe rience itself, from the inside, as it were.  She can 
now relive the experience, as opposed to just thinking about it. 
 An anti-physicalist like Jackson can account for this change in terms of Mary's new 
knowledge of a non-physical fac t.  When Mary experiences red, on this anti-
physicalist account, she discovers that the experience has a characteristic phenomenal 
feature P.  And then, because she has this new knowledge, she can imagine the 
experience by entertaining the thoug ht that someone has an experience with property 
P.  Similarly, she is now able to recall the experience by remembering that she herself 
had an experience with property P. 
 Physicalists will offer an alternative account.  Supposet hat the kind of imagination 
and memory at issue depends on the brain literally recreating a version of the 
experience being imagined or remembered. That is, suppose that first-person 
imagination or memory requires that brain be in a state which is s imilar to the state 
constituting the original experience.  It won't be exactly the same state, since 
imagining or recalling a pain is different from having a pain.  But it could well be a 
similar state, a kind of faint replica, which would fit w ith the fact that an imagined or 
remebered pain shares to some slight extent the unpleasantness of a real pain. 
 This alternative suggestion yields as good an explanation of the fact that you can 
only imagine or recall experiences you have previously undergone as the theory 
which postulates new knowledge of phenomenal property P.  For it seems highly 
plausible that the brain's ability to recreate an experience depends, as a matter of 
empirical fact, on its having at some time had an o riginal version of that experience, 
to give it, so to speak, the mould from which to make the replicas.3
 What is more, this alternative account of Mary's new ability is quite consistent with 
an objective, physicalist account of conscious experiences.  For on this alternative 
account the difference produced in Mary by her original experience of seeing red is 
not that she acquires some new item of knowledge, but simply that she can now do 
something she could not do before, n amely, recreate that experience in imagination 
and memory.4  The earlier account, which attributed new knowledge of phenomenal 
property P to Mary, implied that her previous third-person information about the 
experience left something out.& nbsp; However, since the new account does not 
credit Mary with any such new knowledge, there is now no implication that a 
physicalist account of conscious experience is incomplete. 
 Some readers may feel that this physicalist account of fi rst-person imagination and 
memory is an ad hoc theory whose only attraction is that it saves physicalism.  But 
this would be unjust.  For the account also has the positive virtue, noted in passing 
above, of offerring some explanation of why an i magined or remembered experience 
resembles the original experience itself -- namely, that such imaginings and 
rememberings literally involve a copy of the original experience.5
 D.H. Mellor uses the term "secondary" to refer to this kind of copied experience, the 
kind of experience which ocurs when we recreate in imagination or memory those 
primary experiences we have previously undergone.6  The existence of such 
secondary experiences which resemble their p rimary versions will be central to my 
eventual explanation of the antipathetic fallacy. 
 Of course this talk of "resemblance" between secondary and primary experiences 
needs further elaboratation, both to specify what kind of replication i s involved, and 
to explain how the resulting replicas mimic the original experiences in our cognitive 
workings.  But I take it to be uncontentious that there is some phenomenon of 
resemblance here, and that the model of "secondary" replicas of primar y experiences 
offers a promising route to an explanation. 
 So far I have considered the new recreative powers of imagination and recall 
produced by Mary's first experience of seeing red.  Another such before-and-after 
change is that M ary aquires a new introspective power to reidentify that experience 
when she has it again.  Mary of course always had the ability to recognize "from the 
outside" when somebody was seeing red, from environmental or behavioural or 
physiological evidenc e.  But now she has a new ability, to recognize, by direct 
introspection, that she herself is seeing red. 
 Again, one possible explanation of this new first-person ability would be that Mary 
discovers that the experience of seeing red has phenomenal property P, and that as a 
result she can now pick out experiences with property P as instances of seeing 
red.  But, as before, this is not the only possible explanation of the new ability.  For 
we can suppose instead that Mary si mply acquires a non-conceptual "template", in 
David Lewis's phrase7, which can then be compared directly with further experiences, 
and cause Mary to believe that she is experiencing red again.  She doesn't arrive at 
this belief by noting t hat the experience has property P, and concluding that it is an 
experience of seeing red.  There is simply a mechanism in her brain which compares 
the experience with the template and yields this belief directly. 
 As with the "seconda ry experience" account of imagination and memory, the 
"template" account of introspective recognition both yields a plausible account of why 
we should need the original experience in order to acquire the recognitional ability 
(namely, because the brain ne eds the original to have the materials from which to 
form the template)8, and remains consistent with physicalism (since it doesn't explain 
Mary's new recognitional ability by attributing knowledge of phenomenal property P 
to her, but simply by postulating a new mechanism in her brain). 
 It is an interesting further hypothesis that the same cognitive operations may be 
involved both in recreative and in recognitional abilities.  Perhaps the brain uses the 
processes constitut ing our "secondary experiences" themselves as the "templates" by 
which it classifies new experiences:  that is, perhaps its mechanism for recognizing 
such new experiences is simply to compare them with the replicas which are activated 
in imaginationa nd recall.  It does not seem inevitable that things should work like 
this:  there is no contradiction in the idea of beings who could classify new 
experiences by some template process, and yet lacked the ability to recreate those 
experiences in imagination or memory;  and perhaps it is even possible for there to be 
beings who could recreate experiences, but who lacked the second-order mental 
ability to classify them.  But it seems clear that in human beings the two abilities 
always go together, and the natural explanation is that they do so because the same 
mechanism subserves both. 
4.4  Concepts of Experience
The overall argument of the last section can be put as follows.  In so far as Mary's first 
experience of red leads to her knowing something she didn't know before -- leads to 
her "knowing what the experience is like", if you want to put it that way -- this new 
knowledge can be construed as her knowing how to do something new, r ather than as 
her knowing that anything new.  There are indeed genuine changes produced by 
Mary's new experience.  But these changes are all a matter of her acquiring new 
abilities -- to recreate or recognize the experience -- not of her forming any new kinds 
of judgements about the world. 
 But can this be the full story?  Surely, many readers will feel, new experiences 
doesn't just give us the abilities described in the last section.  They also enable us to 
think new t houghts.  Once you've seen red, then can't you think of that colour, and 
judge it to be vibrant, or threatening, or something everybody should experience at 
least once, in a way you couldn't before? 
 I agree.  But I think that th is too can be accommodated by physicalism.  The 
important question for physicalism is whether new experiences lead to our knowing 
about any new features of the world.  Physicalists need to deny this.  But they can 
consistently allow that ne w experiencs lead to our acquiring new concepts for 
thinking about those features.  In Fregean terms, the change would be at the level of 
sense, not reference.  Mary's thinking about the experience of seeing red would 
change, but what she was th inking about would be exactly the same thing as she used 
to think about when she was a scientist who had never herself seen red.9
 In order to bring out this point, it will be helpful to switch examples slightly for a 
moment, an d consider, not Mary, but Jane, let us call her.  Jane has always shared 
Mary's black-and-white environment.  But Jane is no expert on colour vision.  Indeed 
she has never heard of such things as colours and of people experiencing them. 
 Then one day Jane sees something red.  Unlike Mary, she does not have available 
any public concept of the visual events that take place in people when they are 
presented with red objects.  Indeed she may not even realize that the s ensation she is 
currently experiencing is caused by some observable feature of her environment.  Yet 
we would surely expect Jane to be able thereafter to to form beliefs about that 
sensation, such as that it was vibrant, threatening, something everyb ody should 
experience it at least once, and so on.10
 Mary, on the other hand, does have a public concept of the visual events that take 
place in people when they are presented with red objects.  But, despite this, there se 
ems no question but that Mary might acquire just the same kind of new thoughts as 
Jane does after experiencing red for the first time.  For imagine that, the first time 
Mary experiences red, she does not know what it is --  she simply is n ot aware that 
the curious experience she is now having for the first time is the experience that is 
characteristically caused by red objects.  In this case Mary will surely respond just 
like Jane, and start forming beliefs such as that this new exper ience is vibrant, 
threatening, and so on. 
 At first sight this might seem to substantiate Jackson's knowledge 
argument.  Doesn't the fact that Mary follows Jane in forming new sorts of beliefs 
after her experience show that Mary's ori ginal set of physicalist beliefs must have left 
something out, namely, information about the sunbiective side of the experience?  But 
this conclusion does not follow if, in line with my earlier suggestion, the novelty in 
Mary's beliefs lies at the le vel of sense rather than reference.  And this of course is 
how the physicalist will diagnose the situation.  Before Mary sees red, she has a 
"third-person" concept of this experience.  Afterwards she also has a "first-person" 
concept.  But they are concepts of the same thing.  Mary is in the position of 
somebody who has thoughts about both Cicero and Tully, without realizing they are 
the same person. 
 A natural hypothesis about the structure of the new first- person concept acquired in 
common by Jane and Mary is that it involves a kind of exemplificatory reference by 
secondary experience.  I earlier expressed the new belief formed by Jane and Mary as 
"that experience is vibrant".  I now suggest that we take this construction at face 
value.  Jane and Mary think:  THAT experience is vibrant, accompanied by a 
secondary version of seeing red;  they thereby secure reference to the experience of 
seeing red.11
 ; This account of first-person concepts of experience shows, as before, why you 
can't refer to experiences first-personally until you have had them (you need the 
primary mould to form the secondary replicas), and it does so consistently with 
physicalism ( since you don't become acquainted with any new facts, but just acquire 
new concepts). 
 It is interesting to consider what will happen if and when Mary figures out that her 
new experience is the kind of experience which is characteristicall y occasioned by 
red objects.  The natural upshot, assuming that Mary herself is a physicalist,12 it for 
her to conclude that she has two concepts with the same referent.13  And then, as with 
anybody who realizes this, the t wo concepts will tend to "merge", each becoming 
merely an aspect of the unified concept with which she refers to the experience of 
seeing red. 
 The net result would be the same even if Mary were aware from the start that the 
new experience she is having is the one characteristically occasioned by red 
objects.  For even in this case we could expect Mary to come to share the first-person 
mode of thinking about this experience displayed by Jane, albeit that this new mode 
of thinking woul d now, supposing still that Mary is a physicalist, be "merged" ab 
initio with the concept Mary had when she was just a colour vision scientist. 
 Perhaps there is room to dispute whether such a "merged" concept is really a new 
concept, comp ared with the concept Mary had before seeing red.  The merged 
concept will incorporate both the old third-person physical information Mary always 
had, plus the new first-person mode of thinking she shares with Jane.  There are, 
however, familiar difficulties about whether such amplifications of existing concepts 
count as genuinely distinct concepts, rather than alterations of old concepts.  But 
rather than getting bogged down in the knotty issue of concept identity, let us simply 
agree that Mary's concept of the experience of seeing red has been modified, in a way 
that would not have been possible if Mary had not seen red herself. 
 So, to sum up the argument of this section, once we have new experiences, we are 
led to form new sorts of beliefs about those experiences.  But this does not show that 
we thereby come to refer to any distinctively subjectively phenomema.  For the 
distinctive element in these beliefs need be nothing more that the deployment of first -
person concepts, and, for all that has been said so far, there is no reason to suppose 
that such first-person concepts are not co-referential with third-person concepts of 
experience. 
4.5 The Antipathetic Fallacy
I expect that, despite everything I have said so far, many readers will feel strongly that 
it is a mistake to conclude that "first-person" and "third-person" concepts of 
experience refer to the same things.  For my arguments in the last three sections will 
have done nothing to shake the widespread intuition that conscious experiences and 
brain states are as different as anything can be. 
 Let me summarize the state of play.  So far in this chapter I have considered the str 
ength of arguments against the physicalist identification of conscious experiences 
with brain states.  And I take myself to have shown that these arguments are 
ineffective.  There is no valid argument from "what it is like", or from "knowing wha t 
it is like", to discredit the physicalist view that having a given conscious experience is 
nothing more nor less than being a certain kind of physical system. 
 What is more, I take myself already to have shown, in chapter 1, that the cos t of 
viewing conscious mental states as something distinct from brain states is the denial 
of the efficacy of the mental:  if you think that consciousness is non-physical, then 
you are forced to such undesirable conclusions as that your pain is never the cause of 
the motion of your arm. 
 I think that together these findings give us good reason to accept the physicalist 
view that conscious experiences are not distinct from brain states, and therefore to 
reject any intuitions to the con trary.  However, it would be foolish to deny that such 
intuitions exist.  Such non-physicalist intuitions exert a strong pull on all of us, even 
on us physicalist philosophers who are committed to rejecting them.  So in this 
section I want to offer a diagnosis of these intuitions, with the intention of explaining 
why they arise even though they are mistaken. 
 In the previous two sections I have discussed a variety of ways in which we can 
focus mentally on conscious experienc es, a variety of mental acts which refer to 
types of experience.  These acts can be divided into two main categories:  those 
"third-person" acts which are possible prior to your actually having had the 
experience in question, and those those "fi rst-person" acts which are only possible 
after you have had the experience.  In the former category are all the mental acts Mary 
could perform before she saw red:  her "third-person" imaginings and memories of 
other people experiencing red;  ; her non-introspective identification on behavioural 
or physiological grounds of certain events as experiences of seeing red;  her "third-
person" beliefs, conjectures, and other propositional attitudes about the experience of 
seeing red.  In th e latter category are the "subjective" analogues of all these mental 
acts:  the "first-person" imaginings and rememberings that involve internal recreation 
of an original experience;  the introspective identifications of new experiences by 
direc t comparison with a "template";  the beliefs, conjectures, and other attitudes that 
can be formed by people like Jane whose concept of seeing red involves an element of 
ostension by internal exemplification. 
 The common feature of the se latter "first-person" acts, and what distinguishes them 
from the corresponding "third-person" acts, is that they all deploy a secondary version 
of the experience being referred to.  This is the reason, I have suggested, why the 
first-person acts a re only possible after you have had the experience in question 
yourself.  For it is only after you have had the experience that your brain will have the 
materials necessary to form secondary versions of that experience. 
 I think that this broad division between first-person ways of thinking about 
experience, which employ secondary versions which resemble those experiences, and 
third-person ways, which do not, is the source the strong intuition that conscious 
experiences involve someth ing more than the physics of the brain.  For it is all too 
easy to conclude, when we reflect on the difference between these two categories of 
thought, that only the first-person thoughts really refer to experiences, while the third-
person thoughts r efer to nothing except physical states. 
 The route to this conclusion begins with the perfectly accurate observation that first-
person thoughts include an experiential element which is absent from the third-person 
cases.  First-person thoug hts portray the relevant experience directly, so to speak, by 
giving the thinker a simulacrum, by recreating in the thinker a version of the 
experience being thought about.  Third-person thoughts, on the other hand, do not do 
this, since they do not involve secondary experiences.14
 So there is a sense in which third-person thoughts do indeed "leave something 
out":  they do not give us (versions of) the experience being referred to.  And this 
observation can then easily lead to the further conclusion that third-person thoughts 
are about something different from first-person thoughts:  where first-person thoughts 
refer to the experience itself, in all its conscious immediacy, third-person thoughts 
merely refer to the external trappings of the conscious event, the physical goings-on 
which accompany it. 
 But of course this last step is a fallacy.  The fact that we do not have certain 
experiences when we think third-person thoughts does not m ean that we are not 
referring to them.  To make this move is to succumb to a species of the use-mention 
confusion:  we slide from (a) third-person thoughts, unlike first-person thoughts, do 
not use (secondary versions) of conscious experiences t o portray conscious 
experiences to (b) third-person thoughts, unlike first-person thoughts, do not mention 
conscious experiences.  There is no reason, however, why third-person thought about 
experiences, like nearly all other thoughts about anything, should not succeed in 
referring to items they do not use. 
 I propose to call the above fallacy the "antipathetic fallacy".  Ruskin coined the 
phrase "pathetic fallacy" for the poetic figure of speech which attributes human 
feelings t o nature ("the deep and gloomy wood", "the shady sadness of a vale").  I am 
currently discussing a converse fallacy, where we refuse to recognize that conscious 
feelings inhere in certain parts of nature, namely, the brains of conscious beings. 
& nbsp;  Let me be specific about the target of this charge of fallacy.  My target is not 
the explicit argument against physicalist views of consciousness offered by Jackson.  I 
take the points made in the last two sections already to have sh own what is wrong 
with Jackson's argument.  Rather my target is a covert line of thought, whose 
fallaciousness is obvious once it is spelt out, but which I think has nevertheless 
seduced a great many thinkers into dualism:  namely, the argument which moves from 
the true premise that third-person ways of thinking about conscious experiences do 
not use versions of those conscious experiences, to the false conclusion that those 
ways of thinking do not mention those conscious experience, but only ph ysical states. 
 Let me also be specific about what I take the identification of this fallacy to 
explain.  It is supposed to explain why many people believe that some mental states 
are distinctively non-physical.  It is not suppos ed to explain why some physical states 
are distinctively conscious.  This latter kind of question will be addressed in the next 
section, and I shall there agree that our ability to think about certain states in first-
person ways does nothing to accou nt for their possessing the distinctive inner light of 
consciousness -- though I shall also argue there that the desire to account for such 
inner lights rests on a confusion.  My present concern, however, is not to explain why 
the states we can think about in first person ways are distinctively conscious, but 
rather to explain why these states are widely taken to be non-physical. 
 Both Thomas Nagel, in a well-known footnote in "What is it Like to be a Bat?" 
(1974, pp 446-7), and Willi am Lycan, in his book Consciousness (1987, pp 76-7), 
briefly allude to versions of the fallacy I am concerned with.  My treatment here 
enlarges on their remarks in two respects.  First, both Nagel and Lycan focus 
specifically on the contrast bet ween first-person imagination of conscious 
experiences and the third-person perceptual imagination of the associated brain states: 
the contrast, for example, between imagining having a pain and imagining the visual 
appearance of the relevant parts of the sufferer's brain.  This is certainly one example 
of the kind of contrast I am interested in, but this exclusive focus underemphasizes the 
extent of this contrast.  For, as I have observed, the contrast between first-person and 
third-person modes of thought is not restricted to imagination, but also includes 
memory, identification, and believing, desiring and other propositional 
attitudinizing.  And even within the category of imagination, perceptual imagination 
is not the only kind of third -person imagination:  if we can form non-perceptual 
beliefs and other propositional attitudes about brain states, as we surely can, then 
presumably we can imagine them non-perceptually too.  (Nagel does mention 
"symbolic imagination", but only t o exclude it from his analysis.) 
 Second, neither Nagel nor Lycan emphasize the way that first-person modes of 
thinking about experiences deploy secondary versions of those experiences.  Nagel 
does, it is true, say that first-person i maginings "resemble" the experiences being 
imagined.  But when he goes on to explain how the fallacy arises, his explanation, like 
Lycan's, is simply that first-person and third-person imaginings are independent 
mental acts, each of which can happen witout the other, and that therefore we are 
inclined to conclude that they are about different things.15  But this diagnosis fails to 
distinguish the antipathetic fallacy from all the other cases where different modes of 
thought abou t the same entity can create the impression that two different entities are 
being thought about.  What is distinctive about the antipathetic fallacy, and what 
makes it so very seductive, is the fact that one set of ways of thinking about 
experiences -- the first-person ways -- involve versions of the experience itself, and so 
create the impression that the other ways of thinking about experiences -- the third-
person ways -- leave something out.  In general, when two different mode of thought 
cre ate the impression that two things are being thought about (for example, Cicero 
and Tully), the illusion is easily enough dispelled on receipt of evidence that there is 
in fact only one referent.  But in the mind-body case the impression of differenc e 
continues even in the face of any amount of such evidence, precisely because of the 
extra feature -- the first-person use of secondary versions -- that makes it seem as if 
the third-person modes of thought omit mention of the experience altogether. 16
4.6  Theories of Consciousness
So far I have argued that there are no effective arguments against the physicalist 
identification of conscious states with physical states, and that the admittedly strong 
in tuitions which run counter to this view can be explained away.  It may still seem to 
some readers, however, that a further obligation faces defenders of a physicalist view 
of consciousness:  namely, to answer the question raised briefly in the m iddle of the 
last section, and explain why some states are conscious and others not. 
 The obligation I am thinking of here is not just to provide physicalistically 
acceptable accounts of such specific conscious states as being in pain, see ing red, 
having an itch in your left finger, or so on.  We can suppose for the moment that 
physicalists can somehow specify which physical occurrences constitute each of these 
specific mental states.  The current challenge is rather to giv e an explanation of the 
generic difference between conscious and non-conscious states as such.  Why is 
consciousness present when a person is in pain, or happy, or itching, but not when a 
stone is falling, or a tree is growing, or, for that matter, w hen an anaesthetized human 
is breathing? 
 Some philosophers of physicalist inclinations have proposed "theories of 
consciousness" in answer to this kind of question.  I have in mind the kind of theory 
which aims to identify a physical istically acceptable characteristic common to all and 
only conscious states.  Some such theories are based on assumptions drawn from 
everyday thought (for example, Armstrong, 1968, pp 92-99, holds that the states of 
any self-representing system are c onscious);  others appeal to the resources of 
cognitive science (for example, Dennett, 1978, ch 9, suggests that cognitive systems 
with short-term buffer memories are conscious);  and no such theory, I think, 
commands universal assent. 
 ;  However, we can leave the details of such theories to one side.  For a natural 
reaction to all such theories is that they simply fail to address the philosophical 
question at issue.  At best such a theory will specify some structural or other 
physically acceptable characteristic (A, say) which is coextensive with the class of 
states we are pretheoretically inclined to count as conscious.  But then we still seem to 
face the question:  why does consciousness emerge in just those cases?  And to this 
question physicalist "theories of consciousness" seem to provide no answer. 
 I suspect that many philosophers regard the inability to answer this question as the 
fatal flaw in the physicalist approach to consciousn ess.  Surely, they feel, any 
satisfactory philosophical view of consciousness ought to tell us why consciousness 
emerges in some physical systems but not others. 
 I think that physicalists should simply reject this question.  For the question 
presupposes that there are two different features at issue, the physically acceptable 
characteristic A, and being conscious.  The physicalist is then challenged to explain 
the relation between these properties, and in particular to expl ain why they are 
always found together.  But the physicalist should simply deny that there are two 
properties here.  Being conscious isn't something over and above having A, it just is 
having A.  (In the section after next I shall ask some questions about the sharpness 
and determinacy to be expected from any A which might provide such a physicalist 
reduction of consciousness.  But it will helpful to shelve such worries for the moment, 
and assume that some suitable property A is availab le.) 
 The idea that being conscious just is having some physical state might seem 
intuitively implausible:  surely the difference between conscious and non-conscious 
systems is something more than the difference between having and lac king some 
physical feature.  But the defender of a physicalist theory of consciousness, while not 
denying that these intuitions exist, can account for them as a further manifestation of 
the antipathetic fallacy.  The earlier sections of this cha pter were concerned with the 
thesis that specific conscious states, like seeing red, are identical with specific 
physical states;  and I argued there that our strong contrary intuitions can be explained 
away as due to the antipathetic fallacy. I would now like to suggest that a generalized 
version of this fallacy is responsible for the intuition that any physicalist theory of 
consciousness will necessarily be incomplete 
 We can think of the general property of being conscious as standing to experiences 
like seeing red as determinable to determinate.  Seeing red, being jealous, feeling cold, 
and so on, are the determinate states which have in common the determinable state of 
being conscious.  And so, just as the antipath etic fallacy makes us think that such 
determinate states as seeing red are distinct from any specific physical states, so it 
makes us think that the determinable state of being conscious is similarly distinct 
from any more general physical state.  We are inclined to think of the determinable 
feature as a kind of generalized non-physical light, which stands to the non-physical 
features of particular experiences, as, say, the property of being illuminated as such 
stands to being illuminated with red li ght.  But we shouldn't.  Just as it is a mistake to 
think of experiencing red as something additional to the relevant physical property, so 
it is a mistake to think of being conscious as an extra inner light, over and above the
physical feature A. 
 Once we fully free ourselves from the seductive "inner light" picture of 
consciousness, and take seriously the idea that being conscious may literally be 
identical with some physical A, then we should stop hankering for any further exp 
lanation of why physical state A yields consciousness.  Consider this 
parable.  Suppose that there are two groups of historians, one of which studies the 
famous American writer Mark Twain, while the other studies his less well-known 
contemporary , Samuel Clemens.  The two groups have heard of each other, but their 
paths have tended not to cross.  Then one year they both hold symposia at the 
American Historical Association, and late one night in the bar of the Chicago 
Sheraton the penny drops.  They realize that they have both been studying the same 
person.  At this stage there are plenty of questions they might ask.  Why did this 
person go under two names?  Why did it take so long to find out Mark Twain and 
Samuel Cl emems were the same person?  But it doesn't make sense for them to 
ask:  why were Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens the same person?  If they were, 
they were, and there's an end on it.17
 Similarly, the defenders of a physicalist theory of consciousness can say, with 
consciousness and the physical property A.  The defenders of such a theory will take 
themselves to have discovered that consciousness and A are the same property.  So 
they will allow that we can sensibly ask why there should be different concepts of this 
property, and why it took us so long to realize that they stand for the same thing;  and 
indeed they can answer these questions, by explaining that there are ways of referring 
to conscious phenomena that use secondary versions of those phenomena, and ways 
that don't, and that this in itself makes it easy to succumb to the antipathetic fallacy of 
supposing that different things are being referred to.  But, they will insist, there is no 
further question of why consciousness is always present when physical property A 
is.  If they really are the same thing, then we can't explain why they are the same 
thing.  Somebody who feels there is still a question here has simply failed full y to 
grasp the thesis that consciousness is identical with a physical property. 
4.7 Life and Consciousness
It may seem to some readers that a physicalist theory of consciousness will come 
close to denying the existence of consciousness.  But that would be a mistake.  It 
doesn't deny consciousness, just a certain conception of consciousness. 
 It denies that consciousness is some kind of extra inner light, some further non-
physical property whic h exists over and above any physicalistically specifiable 
property.  But this is quite consistent with holding that consciousness is a real 
property which distinguishes some kinds of systems from others.  This combination of 
views requires only that we accept that consciousness is identical with some property 
which is specifiable in a physicalistically acceptable way. 
 An analogy may be helpful here.  In the nineteenth century there was a heated 
theoretical debate about the essence of life.  The participants had a satisfactory 
enough working notion of life:  they agreed about which kinds of behaviour and 
physical organization are characteristic of life, and in consequence were clear enough 
about where in practice t he line should be drawn.  Everything from humans to 
microbes are alive, while planets and pebbles are dead.  (Perhaps there were some 
borderline cases;  but the penumbra of vagueness was not wide.) 
 Still, despite this wide degree of agreement on the nature of life, nineteenth-century 
thinkers took there to be a further question.  Why are these systems alive?  What 
mysterious power animates them?  And why is this power present in certain cases, 
such as trees a nd oysters, and not in others, like volcanos and clouds? 
 These questions have disappeared from active debate.  Biology textbooks 
sometimes begin with a few perfunctory paragraphs about the distinguishing 
characteristics of their subj ect matter.  But the nature of life is no longer a topic of 
serious theoretical controversy.  Everybody now agrees that the difference between 
living and non-living systems is simply having a certain kind of physical organization 
(roughly, we wo uld now say, the kind of physical organization which fosters survival 
and reproduction). 
 The explanation for this nineteenth-century debate, and of its subsequent 
disappearance, was that it was premised on the notion that living systems w ere 
animated by the presence of a special substance, a vital spirit, or elan vital, which was 
postulated to account for those features of living systems, such as generation and 
development, which were though to be beyond physical explanation.  And of course, 
if you do believe in such a vital spirit, then you will want to know about its nature, 
and why it arises in certain circumstances and not others. 
 However, nobody nowadays believes in vital spirits any more, not least because it i 
s now generally accepted that the characteristic features of living systems can in 
principle all be accounted for in physical terms.  In consequence, it no longer makes 
sense to puzzle about why living systems are alive.  To be alive is just to be a physical 
system of a certain general kind.  There isn't any extra property present in living 
systems, over and above their physical features, which distinguishes them from non-
living systems.  So we have stopped asking questions which presu ppose such an extra 
property. 
 I recommend that we do the same with consciousness.  The apparently nagging 
question, "Why does consciousness arise in certain physical systems?", is premised, I 
claim, on the assumption that consciousne ss is some extra feature, over and above 
any physical characteristic.  But if we accept, as I have argued, that there is no reason 
to view consciousness in this way, then we ought therewith to stop asking why 
consciousness is present in the relevant kind of physical system. 
 Of course the parallel is not complete.  In the case of life, the motivation for 
postulating an elan vital is purely explanatory, a desire to find a cause for phenomena 
which do not appear to be physically ex plainable.  In the case of consciousness, by 
contrast, there is also the extra pressure of the antipathetic fallacy.  Still, this doesn't 
affect the point.  There may be extra reasons for thinking of consciousness as non-
physical, which don 't apply to life.  But once we recognize that it is physical, we 
should do what we did with life, namely, stop asking why it arises in the right 
physical circumstances. 
 One last point about the analogy with life.  Note that the rejection of an elan vital 
does not mean that there is no life.  There may be nothing special about living systems 
except a certain kind of physical organization.  But this does not mean that the 
difference between being alive and not being aliv e is not real.  The postulation of an 
elan vital was simply one theory about the nature of life.  We can reject this theory, 
and yet still uphold, as we do, the distinction between living and inanimate systems. 
 A similar point a pplies to consciousness.  We should reject the theory that 
consciousness involves an extra inner light in addition to facts of physical 
organization.  But we can reject this theory without rejecting consciousnness.  Even if 
consciousness is just a kind of abstract physical organization, the difference between 
being conscious and not being conscious can still be perfectly real. 
4.8  Consciousness is Vague
So far I have been assuming that there is som e well-defined and precise physical 
characteristic A which picks out just those states we are pre-theoretically inclined to 
count as conscious.  However, I doubt that this assumption is justified.  In this section 
I shall argue that any physical ist account of consciousness is likely to make 
consciousness a vague property.  In the next section I shall argue that questions of 
consciousness may not only be vague, but quite indeterminate, in application to 
beings unlike ourselves.  I do no t intend these points as criticisms of 
physicalism.  Rather my aim is to show that if we take physicalism serously, some 
assumptions that we take for granted about consciousness may have to go. 
 The point about vagueness is suggested by the analogy with life.  If life is simply a 
matter of a certain kind of physical complexity -- the kind of complexity that fosters 
survival and reproduction, as I put it above -- then it would seem to follow that there 
is no sharp line between lif e and non-life.  For there is nothing in the idea of such 
physical complexity to give us a definite cut-off point beyond which you have enough 
complexity to qualify as alive.  Rather as with baldness, or being a pile of sand, we 
should expect th ere to be some clear cases of life, and some clear cases of non-life, 
but a grey area in between where there is no fact of the matter.  And of course this is 
just what we do find. While there is no doubt that trees are alive and stones are not, 
there are borderline cases in between, like viruses, or certain kinds of simpler self-
replicating molecules, where our physicalist account of life simply leaves it 
indeterminate whether these are living beings or not. 
 But now, if consciousness is like life, we should expect a similar point to apply to 
consciousness.  For any  physicalist account of consciousness is likely to make 
consciousness depend similarly on the possession of some kind of structural 
complexity -- the kind of com plexity which qualifies you as having self-representing 
states,say, or short-term memories.  Yet any kind of such complexity is likely to come 
in degrees, with no clear cut-off point beyond which you definitely qualify as 
conscious, and before which you don't.  So we should expect there to be borderline 
cases -- such as the states of certain kinds of insects, say, or fishes, or cybernetic 
devices -- where our physicalist account simply leaves it indeterminate whether these 
are conscious states o r not. 
 Some philosophers regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of the physicalist view of 
consciousness.  They take it to be intutitively obvious that there is a sharp line 
between conscious and non-conscious states.18&nbs p;  So they conclude that there 
must be something more to consciousness than a certain kind of physical complexity. 
 I go the other way.  I think that the phsyicalist approach to consciousness is 
correct.  So I reject the in tuition that there is a sharp line between conscious and non-
conscious states.19
 I accept, of course, that such intuitions exist.  But I regard them as a further 
consequence of the "inner light" picture of consciousness, t he picture into which it is 
so easy to be seduced by the antipathetic fallacy.  For if you do think of consciousness 
as such an extra inner light, then you will no doubt think it is a sharp matter which 
states are conscious -- states which possess th e inner light are conscious, and those 
which don't are not.20  On the other hand, if the idea of such an extra inner light is a 
confusion, as I take it to be, then we have no obligation to respect any further 
intuitions which stem fr om it. 
 If the line between conscious and non-conscious states is not sharp, shouldn't we 
expect to find borderline cases in our own experience?  Yet when we look into 
ourselves we seem to find a clear line.  Pains, tickles, visu al experiences and so on 
are conscious, while the processes which allow us to attach names to faces, or to 
resolve random dot stereograms, are not.  True, there are "half-conscious" experiences, 
such as the first moments of waking, or driving a famil iar route without thinking 
about it.  But, on reflection, even these special experiences seem to qualify 
unequivocally as conscious, in the sense that they are like something, rather than 
nothing. 
 However, I don't think that this dis credits my claim that the boundaries of 
consciousness in general are vague.  For I think there is a special reason why we are 
able to draw a sharp line in our own case.  Namely, that in our own case we can 
simply note which states are introspect ible, recreatible in imagination and memory, 
and otherwise accessible in first-person ways.  States which are so accessible we 
count as conscious, and those which are not we consider non-conscious. 
 What exactly is the rationale and s tatus of this decision procedure?  This is a tricky 
question, to which I shall return in the next section.  But whatever view we take on 
this question, note that the decision procedure in question will not work for all 
beings.  For once we move beyond the case of humans, to those many animals and 
other possible organisms who lack the ability to think about their own cognitive states, 
then the decision procedure in question ceases to apply.  So it will be of no help in 
deciding whether the states of sharks, for example, or octopuses, are conscious. 
 So I think we should accept that sometimes it will be a vague matter which states of 
which beings are conscious.  It would be a mistake to conclude from this, however, t 
hat consciousness is unimportant or unreal.  Any number of genuine and important 
properties are vague.  Consider the difference between being elastic or inelastic, or 
between being young or old, or, for that matter, between being alive and not b eing 
alive.  All these distinctions will admit indeterminate borderline cases.  But all of 
them involve perfectly serious properties, properties which enter into significant 
generalizations, are explanatorily important, and so on. 
4.9  Consciousness is Anthropocentric
In this section I want to raise some more serious doubts about consciousness, doubts 
which suggest that consciousness is not only vague, but downright indeterminate. 
 The la st section was premised on the assumption that consciousness involves some 
kind of physical or structural complexity;  the corollary was simply that consciousness, 
like other kinds of complexity, will therefore admit borderline cases.  But what if 
there isn't any specific kind of complexity common to conscious states, vague or 
otherwise? 
 It will be helpful to approach this possibility by returning to the suggestion, made in 
the last section, that in practice we decide which huma n states are conscious by 
considering whether they can be thought about in first-person ways.  Now, there are 
two different ways of looking at this decision procedure.  One would be to regard it as 
a test for the presence of some property that c an be independently specified, such as 
appearing in the short-term buffer memory, say.  On this way of conceiving the matter, 
consciousness is a property that can be independently specified, and first-person 
accessibility is an empirical symptom of t he presence of this independently 
specifiable property.  But there is a rather more plausible way of understanding the 
decision procedure, which analytically ties the test of first-person accessibility to our 
notion of consciousness.  That is, s uppose that our notion of consciousness starts with 
the test of first-person accessibility, and that the reference of this notion is simply 
fixed as that feature which is common to all those states which can be thought about 
in first-person ways.  Fr om this point of view, first-person access isn't an empirical 
symptom of some independently specifiable property, but the hook by which we pick 
out that property in the first place. 
 This alternative, however, leaves open the possibility t hat there isn't any such 
property in the first place, vague or otherwise,  After all, the class of states which we 
humans can think about in first-person ways is extremely heterogeneous.  As well as 
pains, itches, tickles, and the various modes of sense experience, there are emotions, 
cogitations, and moods.  There seems no obvious reason, on the face of it, why there 
should be any structural or other physicalist property common to this whole 
genus.  Each species within the genus may share some common physical or structural 
characteristic which renders it explanatorily significant.  But why suppose that there is 
some further such characteristic, common to members of all these species, which 
binds them all together? 
 ;  What about the property of being first-person accessible itself?  This is a kind of 
structural property, and therefore physicalistically acceptable; and it is unquestionably 
common to all those states which can be thought about in first-perso n ways.  But this 
property is ill-suited to provide an analysis of consciousness.  For, even if first-person 
accessibility provides a reference-fixing description, our notion of consciousness 
seems clearly to be a notion of some other property w hich is responsible for first-
person accessibility, not just the concept of first-person accessibility per se.21
 This is why most people think it obvious that higher mammals, like cats, and bats, 
and human infants, have conscio us states, even though these animals are not capable 
of thinking of their own states in first-person (or any other) ways.  These animals may 
not have first-person access to their own cognitive states.  But their sensory and other 
states seem so closely similar to our own in every other respect that it seems natural to 
conclude that they must share the property that underlies the first-person accessibility 
of our own conscious states, whatever that property might be.22
 However, to repeat the question, what if there is no such property?  What if there 
isn't anything physically or structurally in common to all our first-person accessible 
states?  We may still feel it is uncontroversial that other higher mammals are 
conscious, because of the close overall similarity between their states and our 
own.  But once we start considering beings that are less closely allied to us, like fish 
or toads, not to mention Proxima Centaurians and other extra-terrestrials, t hen we are 
left with nothing to go on, and it becomes quite indeterminate how the notion of 
consciousness should apply to their states.23  The problem here isn't just be the kind 
of vagueness discussed in the last section.  At t hat stage I was assuming we knew 
what kind of organizational complexity was at issue. The only problem was how 
much of it fish and Proxima Centaurians needed to qualify as conscious.  But now we 
are facing the possibility that there is simply n o fact of the matter about what kind of 
physical or structural features you need to qualify as conscious, let alone how much. 
 Even this needn't make us reject talk of consciousness altogether. Maybe 
consciousness isn't an explanatorily im portant property, the kind of property that 
enters into laws and serious explanations.  But the concept can still be useful in 
characterizing humans and closely related beings.  We might draw an analogy with 
concepts like good-looking, or witty.  These are perfectly useful concepts, and indeed 
ones which play an important role in human affairs.  But nobody would think that 
they cut nature at the seams, or that it made any significant sense to apply them to 
beings like fish or toads or Proxima Centaurians. 
 This view of consciousness may seem to have awkward moral consequences.  For 
questions about consciousness often have moral significance.  Whether fish are 
conscious, for example, seems crucial to the issue of how we should treat them.  But 
if there is no fact of the matter as to whether they are conscious, then doesn't it follow 
that that there is no right and wrong about how to treat them? 
 I agree that the position I have reached does have unexpected moral 
consequences.  But I don't think that this shows there is anything wrong with the 
position. Rather, the position helps us to think better about certain moral questions.  I 
take it that the consciousness of fish and similar beings can only be morally important 
if there is a definite fact of the matter.  If there isn't a definite fact of the matter, we 
will do better to base our decisions about fish directly on information about the 
organization of their brains and nerv ous systems, and not on the supposed further 
issue of whether this physical organization makes them conscious.  Indeed, the idea 
that this is a further issue of moral importance here seems to me not only theoretically 
misguided but morally dangerous. 
 Perhaps we might be persuaded by the physical facts that it is wrong to injure 
certain beings, even though we felt unsure, prior to addressing this moral question, 
whether they should be deemed conscious.  In such a case, should we count them as 
conscious because we regard them as objects of moral concern?  I am sure that we 
would do so in practice.  It may seem odd to hold that certain beings might be 
conscious because they are morally significant.  But the thought i sn't that how it is for 
them depends on the moral conclusion --  merely that the moral conclusion would 
give us a motive for refining the indeterminate notion of consciousness in such a way 
as to include them in the category of conscious beings . 
4.10  Pains, Shapes and Colours
In this final section of this chapter I want to return to such specific mental states as 
pains, tickles, visual experiences and emotions, and consider whether these states are 
det erminate, even if consciousness is not.  For nothing in the last section rules out our 
identifying these specific mental states with specific physical or structural properties, 
thus making it definite which beings have them, even if there is no way o f doing this 
for the overall genus of consciousness.  In the terms used earlier, perhaps there are 
physical equivalents for the determinates like pains, sensory experiences, emotions, 
and so on, even if there is none for the determinable property of consciousness itself.24
 Apart from its intrinsic interest, this possibility would make a difference to the 
moral issues touched on at the end of the last section.  It wouldn't matter too much if 
there is no prin cipled basis for deciding whether fish are conscious, if there is a fact 
of the matter on whether they feel pain. 
 However, when we investigate this issue, we shall see that there are problems about 
projecting even such specific conscious states as pain or colour experience onto 
beings other than humans or higher mammals.  For once we abandon the seductive 
picture which identifies these states with different kinds of inner light, as I have 
argued we must, then we must face up to the p ossibility that there is nothing else to 
decide whether some alien being has the same experience as you have when you see 
something red. 
 In a sense such specific states as pains and colour experiences raise a converse 
problem to that rais ed by the generic propery of consciousness.  In the case of the 
generic property, we started with those states which the test of first-person 
accessibility identifies as conscious, and asked what phyicalistically acceptable 
property might tie them to gether.  The problem was that there may not be any such 
property, since the different species of human consciousness are so various.  On the 
other hand, if we start with the states we identify as pains, or experiences of red, and 
so on, the diff iculty isn't so much that they may share no physical features, but that 
they seem to share too many. 
 Let me explain.  It seems likely that human beings who share pains, or colour 
experiences, or other sensory states, will do so becau se they have determinate 
physical properties in common.  So far, so good for physicalism.  But the trouble is 
that it also seems likely that such physical commonalities will appear at a number of 
different levels of abstraction.  For exampl e, it may be that two human beings who 
are both in pain will both have certain kinds of nerve cells firing.  But, if so, then they 
will also share further properties, such as the functional property of having-some-
property-which-plays-a-certain-causa l-role.  The propblem for physicalism is to 
decide which of these competing properties pain is identical with. 
 Lycan (1987) has emphasized that there are likely to be a large number of different 
levels at issue here, starting with ve ry strictly physical levels, which are describable 
only in the language of fundamental physical science, through physiological levels, 
and on to various functional levels, which will themselves be distinguished by the 
fine-grainedness of the causal role t hey involve.  I think Lycan is quite right about 
this.  But for my present purposes nothing will be lost if we revert to the familiar 
philosophical oversimplification, and pretent that there are only two competing levels 
at issue, which we can t ake to be the physiological level ("C-fibres firing", to adopt 
the conventional philosophical shorthand for the physiology of pain) and the folk-
psychological functional level ("a state which mediates between bodily damage and 
the desire to avoid the caus e thereof"). 
 As I observed in chapter 1, there is an obvious rationale for identifying mental states 
with functional states rather than physiological ones.  Namely, that the choice of 
physiological states would have the "chauvinist" implication that beings with different 
physiologies, like toads, perhaps, or silicon-based Proxima Centaurians, certainly, 
could not share our mental states.  Yet it seems unreasonable to conclude that 
Proxima Centaurians cannot believe that the univ erse is expanding, or, for that matter, 
that they cannot feel pains, just because they are made of silicon and not carbon. 
 Yet in the case of conscious mental states, states that it is like something to have, 
there are also strong contrar y intuitions in favour of the equation with physiological 
states.  These intuitions are best elicited by spectrum-inverting thought-
experiments.  Imagine that you have your retina altered at birth so that you respond 
physiologically to green obj ects in the way other people respond to red objects.  After 
the operation you are then raised normally, so that you learn to call red objects "red", 
post letters in post boxes, eat red and not green tomatoes, and so on.  In consequence, 
the stat e produced in you by red objects plays the same causal role as normal people's 
experiences of red.  But the physiology of this state will be like the physiology of 
normal people's experiences of green.  What will it be like when you see a red ob 
ject?  A widespread intuition is that it will be like most people's experience of 
green.  According to this intuition, the subjective nature of your colour experience is 
fixed by what physiological processes are taking place in your brain, and n ot by what 
causal role those processes play.25
 So there seem to be two conflicting intuitions:  the anti-chauvinist intuition that 
wants the Proxima Centaurian to share our mental states, and so equates those states 
with f unctional states;  and the spectrum-inverting intuition that wants people with 
abnormal retinas to see red where we see green, and so favours the equation with 
physiological states. 
 David Lewis (1980) has developed a theory which aim s to accommodate both these 
conficting intuitions.  In Lewis's view, experiences go with physiology for similar 
beings, but with functional role for different kinds of beings.  Lewis considers pain 
rather than colour experience.  He imagine s a human (a "madman") who is spectrum-
inverted with respect to pain.  The madman is arranged so that the physiological state 
which realizes pain in normal humans is produced in him, not by bodily damage, but 
by moderate exercise on an empty stomach;  and it doesn't cause him to writhe or try 
to alter the state, but rather to snap his fingers and think of mathematics.  Lewis takes 
it that the madman will share the experience of pain with normal humans.  So pain 
goes with physiology for humans. 
 But Lewis does not therefore think that an extraterrestrial being (a "Martian") 
cannot feel pain.  He takes it that a Martian will feel pain just in case it is in the 
physiological state that realizes the functional role of pain in normal Martians.  So a 
normal human and a normal Martian who both feel pain will share the functional state 
of being-in-some-state-with-the-relevant-causal-role.  Pain goes with functional role 
for normal beings from different species.&n bsp; (Within the Martian species it goes 
with physiology again:  there could be a mad Martian who feels a pain, not because 
any of its states play the functional role of pain, but because it is in the physiological 
state which plays that role in norm al Martians.) 
 The attractions of Lewis's theory are obvious.  It accommodates the intuition that 
the experiences of spectrum-inverted people depend on their physiology, but avoids 
the chauvinist consequence that beings of other speci es cannot share our experiences. 
 It does, however, have an odd consequence.  Imagine that Martians and humans are 
similar enough to interbreed, in virtue of the fortunate fact that their genes are 
effectively identical;  the onl y substantial exceptions are the genes that direct the 
development of the pain mechanism, where, as it happens, the Martian genes are 
dominant. 
 So a Martian-human hybrid would have its pain mechanism realized by Martian 
rather than human physiology.  Now imagine that such a hybrid exists, and that its 
pain mechanism is activated.  Is the hybrid in pain?  If we count it as a Martian, then 
it will be:  for it will be in the physiological state that realizes the role of p ain in 
normal Martians.  But if we count it as a human, it won't be:  for, although it is in a 
physiological state that plays the functional role of pain, this isn't the state that plays 
that role in normal humans. 
 Lewis is not unaware that his theory has this kind of consequence.  Although he 
does not consider such an extreme case, he does observe that attributions of 
experiences will depend, given his theory, on which populations we assign individuals 
to;  and he adm its that such questions of classification will not always admit of hard-
and-fast answers. 
 Still, even if Lewis is aware of it, this consequence is still pretty odd.  Surely, one 
feels, whether a given being is in pain is a determinat e matter, quite independent of 
what population we might choose to classify it under.  (The hybrid's state isn't going 
to stop hurting, just because the Earth Government changes its immigration 
regulations to allow that a single human parent qualifies you as human.) 
 Odd as this consequence is, I don't think that it should lead us immediately to 
dismiss Lewis's theory.  It is possible that our conviction there is a fact of the matter 
about alien pains stems from the antipathetic f allacy and the associated picture of 
extra inner lights.  For, if pain were an extra inner light, separate from the physics of 
the brain, then it would in principle be determinate which brains were illuminated by 
it.  But if there is nothing the re, apart from the physics of the brain, then it may be 
indeed be arbitrary how to classify beings whose brains are like ours in some respects, 
but not in others. 
 I have illustrated this possibility with respect to pain, as this is the ca se that Lewis 
focuses on. But in fact pain is a somewhat unconvincing example of the 
possibility.  While I do think that there are some sensations whose possession is an 
indeterminate matter, I don't think that pain is one of them. 
 T his is because I do not think that the intuitions in favour of identifying pains with 
physiological states carry much conviction to start with.  Let us go back to Lewis's 
madman.  According to Lewis, the madman's pain is caused, not by injury, b ut by 
moderate exercise on an empty stomach.  And it doesn't make him writhe or want to 
alter his state, but simply to snap his fingers and think of mathematics.  Given all this, 
it doesn't seem to me to make much sense to say the madman is in p ain.  The 
madman may share the physiology of normal humans in  pain.  But if this 
physiological state causes the madman no discomfort, if he lacks all inclination to 
make it go away, then I'm inclined to say that it doesn't hurt, that it's just not a pain. 
 The concept of a conscious pain, it seems to me, is the concept of being-in-a-state-
which-disposes-you-to-certain-sorts-of-behaviour. Something just isn't a pain unless 
your initial reaction is to get rid of it.  If this is right, then pains must be equated with 
functional states, rather than physiological ones.  So "madmen" and "mad Martians" 
are not in pain, even though they share the physiology of their normal 
conspecifics.  And this now removes the earl ier indeterminacy:  the human-Martian 
hybrid is unequivocally in pain, however we classify it, for its state plays the 
functional role of pain. 
 This disambiguation may of course still leave us with a penumbra of vagueness.  ; 
Even if pain is firmly tied to functional role rather than physiology, there may remain 
an indeterminacy about how complex this functional role has to be before it qualifies 
as pain.  But vagueness is a different issue, as we saw earlier.  Our current concern is 
what kind of physical or stuctural complexity pain should be identified with.  We can 
have a definite answer to this question even if we are vague about how much of that 
complexity is needed.. 
 Which other sensatio ns are like pain in being conceptually tied to 
behaviour?  Sensations like these will be unequivocally identifiable with functional 
rather than physiological states, and in consequence their ascription to beings other 
than ourselves will be determina te, up to the boundaries of vagueness. 
 There is good reason to regard visual experience of shapes as like pain in this 
respect.  A number of recent works have focussed on such experiences, and their 
arguments strongly support the vie w that visual experience of shape goes with 
functional dispositions to behaviour rather than with the phsyiology of the normal 
viewer.  A test case would be a person who is in the physiological state that normally 
goes with seeing something square, b ut tries to draw the shape in question by making 
circular arm movements.  Intuition strongly favours the view that this person must 
have the conscious experience as of seeing something circular, and thus supports the 
identification of the experience with functional role rather than physiology.26
 Indeed, in the case of spatial perception, there seems to be direct empirical evidence 
in favour of a functional over a physiological identification.  I am thinking here of th e 
well-known psychological experiments in which subjects wear glasses with "inverting 
lenses".27  When they first wear the lenses, subjects faced with an upright drinking 
cup, say, will have both the physiology, and the dispositions to beh aviour, that 
normally go with an upside-down cup.  Accordingly, we can all agree that at this 
stage the subjects see the cup as upside down.  But after a while such subjects learn to 
adjust their behaviour, so that they come to behave in the way appropriate to upright 
cups, even though they still have the physiology that normally results from upside-
down cups.  And at that stage they then say that the cup "looks the right-way up" 
again.  This obvious fits with the thesis that conscious spatial perception is tied to 
behaviour rather than physiology. 
 In fact this experiment is less straightforward than it seems.  For the inverting-lens 
experiment doesn't so much test the thesis that spatial perception is tied to beh aviour 
(after all, I am treating this as a conceptual truth), as the conjunction of this thesis 
with the further assumption that subjects can tell what kind of experience they are 
having, even after they have been turned into "spatial madmen".  To co nfirm this, 
note that somebody who holds that spatial perception goes with normal physiology, 
rather than with normal behavioural function, can accommodate the inverting-lens 
experiment simply by arguing that retrained subjects can no longer be relied on to 
report accurately which how things look to them.28
 Now consider colour experiences.  In this case it seems unlikely that there is any 
conceptual tie between seeing something as red, say, and behaving in any particular w 
ay.  When I introduced the colour-spectrum-inverting thought experiment earlier in 
this section, I said that after the operation you would "call red objects 'red', post letters 
in postboxes, eat red and not green tomatoes, and so on".  Most of t he behaviour 
involved in this functional characterization (saying "red", using red postboxes) 
depends on nothing more than social convention, and so can scarcely be part of what 
it is to see red.  (We don't want to say that you can't see red unless y ou know the 
English word "red".)  And the non-conventional behaviour associated with seeing red 
(eating tomatoes and similar fruit) still seems too thin and topic-specific to tie down 
the experience.29
 So colour experience s are different from pains and spatial perception.  I do not 
want to deny that such experiences as seeing red have a characteristic functional 
role.  After all, common sense criteria, which define the functional role for red, are 
clearly suffici ent in practice to decide which human beings are experiencing red.  (In 
this connection we should not forget the central fact that red objects normally cause 
red sensations.)  But, by contrast with pains and spatial perceptions, colour experienc 
es do not have a stock of non-conventional desires or actions to call their own.  And, 
because of this, it seems unconvincing to argue, as we did for pains and spatial 
perceptions, that colour experiences are determinately tied to functional roles, r ather 
than to physiology.  Where there is a direct link between an conscious experience and 
something we non-conventionally do, then it seems natural to hold that this functional 
link fixes the nature of the experience.  But with experiences whi ch lack any such 
intrinsic tie to action, there seems to be no corresponding rationale for holding that 
functional role, rather then physiology, determines the experience. 
 So I conclude that with colour experiences (and similarly for tast es and smells30) 
there is a real indeterminacy about how to project our categories beyond the case of 
normal humans.  As long as the physiology and the functional role continue to go 
together, then there is no problem.  But when we ha ve one without the other, as with 
the subject of the spectrum-inverting operation (the "colour madman"), -or a Martian 
who comes to earth and learns to make our colour discriminations, then I don't think 
there is any fact of the matter about whether they have the same experiences as us. 
 There is still David Lewis's strategy, which decides such cases by seeing whether 
the difficult individuals share the physiology of the functionally normal members of 
their group.  But then, as we saw , it may be indeterminate which group we should 
consider the difficult individuals to be part of.  Lewis's strategy does place some extra 
constraints on our ascriptions of colour experiences to difficult cases.  But, by making 
such ascriptions d epend on assignments to groups, Lewis in the end only hides the 
underlying arbitrariness of experiential classifications under the cloak of a different 
arbitrariness. 
 I realise that some readers will think it ridiculous for me to suggest that it is an 
arbitrary matter whether or not colour madmen are counted as have the same 
experiences as the rest of us.  (Surely either they do or they don't).  But let me recall a 
point I made at the end of the last section.  I am not sugg esting that how it is for the 
colour madman will depend on how we classify his experience.  Of course it 
won't.  My claim is only that it is indeterminate whether the madman's experience is 
the same kind of experience as our experience of red.&n bsp; That is, I don't think that 
there's anything lacking in the colour madman.  It's just that the notion of sameness of 
colour experience breaks down when we come to such cases. 
 No doubt some readers will find even this absurd.&nbs p; Even if I am not saying 
that we can alter feelings by linguistic fiat, isn't it bad enough for me to be saying that 
experiential comparisons are indeterminate?  Take one of the madman's colour 
experiences.  Now imagine what it's like to see a bright red tomato.  Surely the 
madman's experience is either like that, or it's not.  What could be simpler? 
 But I don't think think it is that simple.  The reason it seems simple is that we 
naturally suppose that, when we have (or imagine) a visual experience, we switch on 
an inner light.  And so we all we need to do is compare that shade of inner light with 
the shade illuminating the madman's mind.  But there isn't any such inner light.  There 
are just the physical and structural features of the relevant brains, some of which we 
share with the madman, and some of which we don't.  So our conviction that either the 
madman must feel the same or feel different is based on a false picture.  Wittgenste in 
had a good analogy:  "You surely know what 'It's 5 o'clock here' means; so you also 
know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means.  It means simply that it is just the same 
time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock." (1953, §350.) 
1. This follows standard practice in this area: see Horgan (1984, pp 147-8) and Tye 
(1986, p 1). 
2. Moreover, most of the arguments between dualism and physicalism arise in exactly 
the same way between dualism and any more general non-physi calist "objectivism" 
about conscious mental states.  I shall formulate the issues as a matter of physicalism 
versus dualism, however, since I think there are good arguments -- namely, those 
presented in chapter 1 -- for preferring physicalism to othe r kinds of 
objectivism.  Even so, much of what follows should also be of interest to objectivists 
who are not physicalists.
3. An immediate qualification is needed here.  For we can obviously imagine complex 
experiences, like seeing a unicor n, as long as we've previously experienced the 
elements separately.  And we can perhaps imaginatively extrapolate to intermediate 
experiences, like imagining a colour which is spectrally between others we have 
previously experienced.  But these possibilities are clearly consistent with the general 
thesis that the brain needs to acquire the materials for the replicas from previous 
experiences, and so in accord with the fact that we can't imagine experiences of a 
radically unfamiliar kind, like se eing colours at all, or echolocating, until we have 
actually had those experiences. 
4. The view that Mary acquires new abilities rather than new knowledge is urged by 
Lewis (1988) and Lemirow (1990). 
5. Note that the alternative non-physicalist ac count, in terms of phenomenal property 
P, does nothing at all to explain why the exercise of our recreative abilities should in 
some sense make us re-experience the original mental state.  Thinking of or 
remembering something as an event with some pr operty P can in general have any 
experiential nature, or none at all.  Of course, it could be argued that, in the particular 
case of some phenomenal property P, thinking of or remembering an event with that 
property involves recreating in your brain a copy of the experience characterized by 
the property.  But, once this last move is made, then it becomes unnecessary to bring 
in the phenomenal property P to explain Mary's new imaginings and memories in the 
first place -- for now we can simply exp lain these imaginings and memories directly, 
by appealing her recreative abilities. 
6. For this terminology, see Mellor (1992, p 11). 
7. Lewis (1983, pp 131-2) 
8. Again a qualification is needed to accommodate the fact the we can recognize nov 
el complex experiences, as long as their components have previously been 
experienced:  in such cases the brain doesn't need an original complex experience to 
form a complex template, but only the originals of the component experiences to form 
templat es of the components. 
9. Cf Peacocke (1989, pp 67-9). 
10. Isn't Jane ruled out by Wittgenstein's private language argument?  Well, she'd 
better not be, if Wittgenstein's argument is any good, since Jane is clearly possible.  I 
don't thin k there is in fact any tension here.  I take the moral of Wittgenstein's 
argument to be that there must be room for error in people's judgements about their 
experiences, not that those judgements must necessarily be expressed in a language 
used by a community.  And I see no reason to suppose that Jane cannot make 
mistakes about her own experiences. 
11. This suggestion is central to the response made to Jackson's argument in Horgan 
(1984). 
12. Of course, if Mary isn't a physicalist, then she will be disinclined to make this 
identification, and will no doubt maintain that the first-person concept she shares with 
Jane refers to a phenomenal attribute, whereas her scientific concept refers to a 
physical phenomenon. 
13. Won't  this r ealization  involve some new information, of a kind Mary couldn't 
have had before her experience? After all, someone who discovers that a = b, where [a] 
and [b] express two modes of presentation of the smae object, will generally acquire 
the informat ion that the property invoked by [a] is co-extensional with the property 
invoked by [b]. So won't Mary acquire the new information that the property of 
having such-and-such neurones firing is co-extensional with the phenomenal with the 
phenomenal property of red? However, this argument assumes that Mary's first-
person mode of presentation of the experience of red invokes some phenomenal 
property. In contrast, I have just suggested that this is an indexical construction. If this 
is right, Mary no more acqu ires new non-physical information than someone who 
suddenly realizes that it is noon now. 
14. Or, if they do involve secondary experiences, as when we think about somebody 
being in pain, say, by thinking about the visual aspect of their behaviour or b rain state, 
then they will be different secondary experiences, secondary version of visual 
experiences, not secondary versions of pain experiences. 
15. In line with this, Lycan calls the fallacy the "stereoscopic fallacy". 
16. In a generous gestur e of help to his physicalist opponents, Nagel points out that 
the fallacy in question provides an answer to Kripke's modal argument against mind-
brain identity.  Kripke (1972) appeals to the principle that identity statements 
involving rigid designat ors are necessarily true, and then challenges physicalists, who 
identify mind and brain, to account for the apparent contingency of mind-brain 
identity statements.  Nagel's suggestion is that, instead of looking for some non-rigid 
way of reading the terms in these statements, which is how we account for other 
apparently contingent identity statements, like "water = H20", physicalists should 
simply explain the appearance of mind-brain contingency by reference to the fallacy 
that makes us so convinced that mind and brain are different to start with.  On this 
suggestion, we won't explain away the appearance of contingency by finding some 
non-rigid reading which is violated in other possible worlds, as we do with the other 
cases.  Rather, we si mply account for the appearance of contingency by explaining 
why we are so disinclined to accept mind-brain identities in the first place.  I agree 
with Nagel that this is the right way for physicalists to respond to Kripke's argument. 
17. Ned Bl ock offered this story to me;  I don't know where it originated. 
18. Cf McGinn (1982, pp 13-14). 
19. An alternative physicalist response to the intuition that consciousness is not vague 
would be to seek some physicalist characteristic A which does provide a sharp 
dividing line.  But this strategy strikes me as unlikely to succeed. 
20. Thus McGinn, ibid: "The emergence of consciousness must rather [unlike the 
emergence of life] be compared to the sudden switching on of a li ght . . ." 
21. No doubt the idea of an inner light as such a property is partly responsible for our 
having this notion of consciousness.  But it would be a pity, I think, to build the inner 
light itself into our notion of consciousness. 
 ; 
22. This is of course the standard objection to self-monitoring theories of 
consciousness like Armstrong's. 
23. Chris Hughes suggested to me that the relevant question is whether the states of 
toads and similar beings would be first-person acces sible, if they occurred in beings 
who could introspect, imagine, and so on.  But I doubt this really removes the 
indeterminacy.  Exactly which counterfactual possibilities are we supposed to 
consider?  Is the question whether we humans coul d introspect toad states, if they 
occurred in us?  Or are we supposed to consider super-toads, who stand to toads as we 
do to monkeys?  But then what is supposed to stop us considering super-trees, say, or 
super-stones? 
24. If so, couldn't w e just disjoin the determinates to get a physical equivalent for the 
determinable?  But we still lack a principle to generate all instances of the genus.  We 
might be able to cover all human determinates by brute enumeration.  But, in the a 
bsence of any property equivalent to consciousness as such, there will be nothing to 
decide which states of the Proxima Centaurians should be included in the disjunction. 
25. Note how this thought experiment differs from the traditional vesrion, in wh ich 
physical identicals have inverted spectra.  I take this traditional version to be 
discredited by the general arguments for physicalism.  The modern version, by 
contrast, involves people with different physiologies.  So it doesn't presen t a problem 
for physicalism as such, but only for functionalism. 
26. See in particular McGinn (1989, pp 58-94), Davies (1992).  It should be said that 
this literature is more concerned with whether spatial experiences have broad or 
narrow content s than with their phenomenal identity as conscious states.  But the two 
issues are connected.  See Davies, op cit, sect III.  Davies's concern with the issue of 
content leads him to distinguish carefully between internal inclination to beha viour, 
and actual external behaviour (with phenomenology going with the former, and 
content with the latter).  But from our perspective these are alike matters of functional 
role. 
27. See Gregory (1977, ch 12). 
28. Some readers mig ht feel it would make more sense for sensory states to be 
incorrigibly tied to introspective reports, instead of to further links to behaviour.  But 
it seems wrong to rule out introspective mistakes in this way.  Apart from anything 
else, there are brain abnormalities that seem to affect introspective abilities rather than 
anything else.  Morphine is a good example:  it makes people say that the pain is still 
there (even though they don't mind it);  but, if Daniel Dennett (1978, p p 208-9) is 
right, these people are not in pain on anybody's account, since not only do they fail to 
display pain behaviour, but they also lack the normal physiology of pain. 
29. Janet Levin (19xx) takes the contrary view that even experiences of colo ur, taste 
and smell might be definable by their links with non-conventional behaviour.  In line 
with this, she suggests that spectrum-inverting operations with these modalities might 
turn out like the "inverting lens experiment":  at first the m admen's responses will 
involve both the "wrong" physiology and the "wrong" behaviour ;  but after a while 
they will adjust their behaviour to make it "right";  and then things will seem 
conscioulsy "right" to them once more.  This argument raises a number of 
issues.  Central is whether the inversions would lead to systematically inappropriate 
behaviour of a kind that could be remedied by a systematic (rather than picemeal) 
rewiring of our behavioural responses. I agree with Levin that if this were so, then it 
would be appropriate to describe the rewired people as having the "right" 
phenomenology again.  What I doubt is whether there are such systematic links 
between the relevant experiences and behaviour to start with. 
3 0. Sounds raise yet further issues, which I shall not pursue.  Note that the 
categorization of experiences in terms of their links with behaviour does not coincide 
with the division between primary and secondary qualities.  I have argued that a 
constitutive link to behaviour is present both in experience of shape, which is a 
primary quality, and  painfulness, which can be thought of as a (hyper-)secondary 
quality. 
